The United States Should Resume Strategic Dialogue With Kosova: Here’s Why

The seals of the US State Department and Presidency of Kosova sit side-by-side against the backdrop of Skanderbeg Square in Prishtina.

There would have been no independent Republic of Kosova without the determined support of the United States; that much is safe to say. Yet even ties this deeply bound, recent years have proven, are not inherently immune from the fluctuations of geopolitical uncertainty.

In early September 2025, the US State Department announced that it had “indefinitely suspended its planned Strategic Dialogue” with the Prishtina government. As if this initial round of alarm bells did not suffice, it was followed up by an official announcement, some months after Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s meeting with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, that America would launch its first rounds of Strategic Dialogue with Belgrade in 2026.

How did this come about?

In order to understand the present impasse, we must briefly revisit and examine the foundation of the relationship between the two states. Following the 1999 intervention against Serbia's ethnic cleansing campaign and establishment of the United Nations-led administration (UNMIK), the United States served as a key architect of post-war Kosova, a role altogether different from that of a mere distant investor.

The US was among the first to recognize Kosova as the “independent and democratic state” declared by then-Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi 18 years ago on 17 February, 2008 and Washington stood as the most capable ally in diplomatic, institutional and military terms, as was affirmed with the development of the Camp Bondsteel military base near the city of Ferizaj. This American support has by no means been episodic, but rather a fundamental anchor to Kosova’s legitimacy, rooted in a shared value system and geostrategic direction, including its value as a counterweight to the Russian and Chinese influence that Serbia, with its regional military might, has allowed to take hold.

Through the Obama administration, and even into the first Trump term, the relationship remained firmly stable, if occasionally punctuated by tactical disagreements and infamous events like the proposed “land swap” between Kosova and Serbia in 2018. Under President Biden, the alignment of rhetoric was tightly paired with an emphasis on the possibility of Kosova’s integration into NATO and further alignment with European structures. The premise of the relationship remained remarkably consistent: Kosova, albeit a small and landlocked republic, wished to express itself as a dependable and strong Western ally in this fragile region, establishing that its well-being and stability served as a net positive to the broader interests of the West in the Balkans.

In spite of Kosova’s commitment to international alignment, recent years have seen sharper — and more noticeable — oscillations. The degree of friction with the US position must be understood in the context of differences over tactical questions: in what manner to approach dialogue with Belgrade, how economic normalization should be structured and how to manage the Serb-majority municipalities in the north of the country, which even included deeply misguided sanctions and reproaches by the Biden administration, being chief among them. What feels different about the present situation is its framing: whereas earlier disputes occurred within an overarching consensus about Kosova's sovereignty and its strategic value, recent events suggest a recalibration in which economic weight and transactional diplomacy are given priority — including a new charm campaign on Vučić’s Serbia.

A recalibration of this magnitude must be examined candidly. Serbia’s larger, more developed economy as well as its geographic centrality and position on the Danube, one of the most fruitful routes of commerce in Europe, have little by little made it an object of American engagement. However, within certain circles of the current administration, the calculus seem to be simplified to an almost facile conjecture: Serbia is bigger, therefore it must matter more to American strategy.

This brand of thinking first made an appearance in Trump’s first term, particularly in the emphasis on the aforementioned economic normalization led by then-Ambassador to Germany and Special Presidential Envoy to the Kosova-Serbia negotiations Richard Grenell, whose influence we covered in a previous article. The premise articulated then held that infrastructure, trade and investment could circumvent the entrenched political and ethical disputes which continue to be present — leading to Grenell’s role in removing Albin Kurti from the office of Prime Minister in 2020 after abrasions concerning, but not limited to, the 100% tariff on Serbian goods by Kosova. What such an approach risks is reducing the complex question of sovereignty to mere balance sheets and cash flow, an odd and jarring approach in the face of the existential security threat that Kosova faces.

The ongoing suspension of the Strategic Dialogue therefore represented more than a simple delay in bureaucracy. What it conveyed is a perception that Kosova was being measured by different standards, stripped of the benefit of a consistent strategy. The subsequent announcement that the Trump administration would seek to further Strategic Dialogue with Serbia instead further shaped a contrast that became difficult to ignore. Frustratingly, the status quo seems to require Kosova to repeatedly prove its clearly established loyalty and stability, while ignoring repeated indications that Serbia does not intend to move away from its deep security, political and economic ties to the Kremlin and Beijing.

To better understand this dynamic, we spoke to Dr. Dritan Demiraj, who has previously served as a Colonel in the Albanian Armed Forces and the Minister of the Interior of Albania. Dr. Demiraj noted that “the last three US administrations have invested tens of millions of dollars in the economic sphere, while also offering concessions” to bring Serbia closer to the Western camp, yet “this did not yield much." He also cautioned against the view accepted among some circles, including Albanians, that Prime Minister Kurti is an anti-American figure as part of a broader “Serbian narrative" aimed at undermining this most crucial of relationships. Neither did he see a point in catastrophizing the suspension of the Strategic Dialogue, pointing to Kosova’s invitation to the Board of Peace and deep defense coordination with the US as evidence of a dynamic and ongoing partnership.

It is indeed important not to devolve and collapse every disagreement into a narrative of the West and the U.S. abandoning Kosova. The small republic has, at times, adopted positions that diverged sharply from the preferences of Washington. This has most famously materialized in the ideology of Prime Minister Kurti, who leads the governing Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination) Party. Kurti’s emphasis on reciprocal treatment in negotiations with Serbia, and his resistance to US-backed measures perceived as undermining his rightful authority in the north of Kosova, have occasionally clashed with the thinking of American diplomats. As it stands, though, principled disagreements are a core quality of mature alliances. Thus, qualms like these cannot reasonably lead to a disregard of Kosova’s pro-American position in the high-stakes geopolitical environment of the region. Strikingly, not only do Kosova’s citizens hold the most positive perception of the United States anywhere in the globe, as measured in a 2024 Gallup poll, but this world-leading support has remained in place for the Trump administration. Serbia, by contrast, stood at the bottom of the list, with only 16% of those polled showing support for the present US leadership.

To establish a perspective seemingly held by many Albanians, we spoke to Morris Peshtani, an Albanian-American PhD student at Rutgers University who has been consistently vocal about his support for President Trump. Peshtani described the suspension as a “wake-up call” placing Kosova at a crossroads between the state’s multiethnic framework and the far more explicitly Albanian nationalist stance Kurti held before coming to power. On the seeming rapprochement between the present US administration and the historic Russo-Serbian axis, he commented that considering “the Trump administration’s willingness to send Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine … growing frustration with Putin, and … willingness to further sanction and impose tariffs on Russia and its allies, fears that this is a sign that the US will seek to replace its current European alliances with Russia and Serbia remain unfounded.”

This dynamic concerns the region as a whole. After decades, even centuries of conflict, the Western Balkans remains a contested geopolitical space, enticing to any powerful state seeking to extend its influence. As mentioned, Serbia maintains close ties to both Moscow and Beijing; what is particularly relevant here is that both powers have proven unfailingly attentive to any signal of Western fragmentation. When Washington appears to downgrade engagement with Prishtina, the shift is sure to be noticeable not only in those capitals but to bad-faith actors throughout the region and beyond.

Kosova, for its part, must respond steadily rather than react impulsively. Firstly, it should intensify communication across the breadth of the American political system, not only with the State Department and defense institutions but also the U.S. Congress, without which its moral case would never have been effectively heard on the international stage in the 1990s. Secondly, the country must seek to separate domestic political battles from the management of its alliances; no squabble is important enough to risk the support of a historic ally of this magnitude. Thirdly, Kosova’s Albanian politicians must avoid portraying every disagreement as a threat to the republic’s sovereignty, which only encourages a vicious self-fulfilling prophecy and fans the flames of instability. The historical US investment into Kosova’s independence is not easily erased. Yet neither is it automatic or self-executing; it must be maintained by disciplined diplomacy and strategic patience, not brash moves that are not fit for a republic which, for better or for worse, must operate within the constraints of greater powers.

At the same time, Washington is bound to remember that alliances cannot be determined in the fashion of accounting equations or financial statements. Kosova’s value has never derived solely from GDP, market size or other indicators of economic output. The value is embedded in its unique alignment with Western democratic values in the region and its willingness to invest in its own stability and that of its neighbors. In its new Dialogue with Belgrade, the present administration is also likely to be reminded of the lessons first encountered by its predecessors, that Serbia will not prove amenable to attempts to fundamentally rearrange its geopolitical posture, no matter the quality of the carrot offered.

The United States should resume Strategic Dialogue with Kosova as a reassertion of its long-standing role and constructive logic in the Balkans, and not as any kind of concession. Stability in Southeastern Europe has never been brought closer through short-term transactional gains. Rather, it requires a recognition that smaller allies can also carry strategic weight disproportionate to their size. Recent history has already demonstrated what American commitment in Kosova can accomplish. As such, the present moment does not require the reinvention of the relationship between the two states, but a committed and thoughtful renewal.

Arbanon Magazine is an independent media platform covering key themes in Albanian and Balkan history and current affairs, and beyond. We seek to bring untold stories of the past to light along with sharp analysis of the geopolitical and cultural issues of the day. Follow our social media to remain up-to-date.