There Would Have Been No Albanian Independence Without Isa Boletini
- Valton Vuciterna
- 37 minutes ago
- 13 min read
The independence of the modern Albanian nation-state from the Ottoman Empire is a date that is ingrained into the minds and souls of Albanians around the globe. The 28th of November is seldom forgotten, owing to the fact that it is the day of the declaration of self-determination for the nation, the anniversary of Gjergj Kastrioti Skënderbeu’s liberation of Kruja, as well as the birthday of Kosova Liberation Army founder and leader Adem Jashari. The fateful day in 1912, however, marked a triumphant culmination of the Albanian Renaissance (Rilindja), finally breaking the land out of the sphere of Turkish imperialism that supervised and harvested the capital, human or natural, that Albania had to provide. While the intellectual and diplomatic figures of Ismail Qemali, Luigj Gurakuqi and the like played a crucial role in the establishment of a free Albania, the sheer fragility of the Albanians’ opportunity to declare independence has often been understated.
This special piece aims to argue that the window was kept open, so to speak, by armed Albanian resistance; primarily the actions of a man known as Isa Boletini. His influence ran so deep and structurally essential that the movement would have found it nigh impossible to properly cohere without him. Boletini’s role was not only displayed on the battlefield, but in diplomacy, mediation and political engagement between the Ottoman state, Albanian tribal structures as well as the distinct environment of the Great Powers. Without the historical architecture erected by his actions, the timing and feasibility of independence would have been gravely undermined, if not entirely precluded.
Biography
Isa Boletini was born on 15 January 1864 in the village of Boletin, located today near the city of Mitrovica in the north of Kosova, into the Maksutaj brotherhood of the Shala tribe. His parents were Adem and Ajshe Boletini (neé Potera). The Shala tribesmen the family traced their descent to fled the village of Isniq near Deçan in the west of Kosova due to a blood feud, an ancient Albanian vendetta practice, and made their way north. Following the establishment of the League of Prizren in 1878, an organization which ultimately sought greater autonomy for the Albanian people within the Ottoman Empire, Boletini would begin active participation in the political environment of the region, ultimately culminating in his role in the Battle of Slivova against Ottoman forces in 1881.
The League, ultimately failing in its goal of unifying the Albanian vilayets into a single autonomous entity through diplomatic means, would make one last attempt to resist the partitioning of Albanian lands by means of armed conflict against the Ottomans. Their aim was to halt the surrounding newborn nation-states from gaining territory within the existing Albanian-inhabited vilayets.
Wishing to push back against the gifting of Ulqin, a major Albanian-inhabited port city, to Montenegro by the Ottomans following the eponymous battle in the city, the League would meet the Ottomans on 16 April 1881 near the city of Ferizaj (then Ferzovik) in the vicinity of the villages of Koshare and Slivova. Boletini, just seventeen years old, alongside Sefë Kosharja and Mic Sokoli, would meet Dervish Turgut Pasha’s combined force of 15,000 men against their estimated three to four thousand Albanian kaçak fighters.
Despite the League's forces losing 800 men compared to the 1,800 Ottoman casualties, the battle would ultimately end on the 20th of April with the death of Mic Sokoli and the capture and execution of Sefë Kosharja. Sokoli would famously sacrifice himself by pressing his chest against an Ottoman cannon after Kosharja’s strategic bombardment of Ottoman artillery positions by means of catapult. Sokoli’s heroic actions would disrupt the firing of the Turkish cannon onto the League’s lines, but would culminate in the capture of Kosharja, and later his hanging by Dervish Turgut Pasha. However, this event would also mark a major pre-independence demonstration of unity between various Albanian regions and figures, and would set the stage for later revolts.
After the Battle of Slivova, the League of Prizren would gradually dissipate and create a power vacuum in northern Albania and Kosova. Ottoman administrators attempting to maintain control of these regions would compete against local Albanian chieftains vying for authority. Boletini, now with military and political experience, would establish a substantial presence in his native region of Bajgora in northern Kosova, becoming the de facto arbiter of local disputes.
He would also begin to take active part in the political environment of the region after his experience as a hired guard under the Turkish deruhdecilik paid protection system for the nearby Sokolica Orthodox Monastery, alongside his two brothers. Ever the opportunist, Boletini would receive weapons, money and even an award from Serbia for his defence of the monastery; this was not necessarily motivated by a desire to defend the Serbs of the region, but rather to further cement his role as an authority figure in the local community.
This pragmatic approach from Boletini would prove to be a thorn in the side of Ottoman officials and Sultan Abdülhamid II. The Sultan, rather than crushing the threat of Boletini’s influence, would instead choose to co-opt and introduce him into the imperial orbit. This was an attempt on the Ottoman government’s part to further integrate Albanians into the bureaucratic system. While the Ottomans sought to utilize the tribal structures and traditions in Albanian lands as means to their own ends, local figures such as Boletini often served their own regional interests, and merely cooperated with the Ottomans in order to maintain their status, privileges and autonomy within the Empire.
It is again important to note that this was not motivated by a desire to preserve the Islamic caliphate, as some have erroneously claimed, but to maintain the advantages presented to Albanians; meaningfully analogous to the initial rationale behind the mass conversion to Islam amongst the Albanian people. As such, in 1902, Abdülhamid invited Boletini to Istanbul and made him a member of the palace guard, the tüfenkciler.
Boletini would return to Kosova in 1906 after spending four years serving in the Yıldız Palace, this time with a line of communication to the imperial capital while also resuming his role as a regional guardian, expanding his influence exponentially. Boletini’s time in Istanbul granted him exposure to the mechanics and complexities of the Hamidian government. However, his relationship with the Sultan was somewhat paradoxical: Abdülhamid admired the chieftain and sought to make use of his influence, yet remained wary of his autonomy. Boletini, on the other hand, respected the Sultan’s authority but never fully subordinated, maintaining contact with leaders in Kosova and using his experience as leverage against the fragile Ottoman machine, granting him significant – and armed – autonomy.
Despite reform efforts, the Hamidian government failed to maintain security and stability in Albanian lands during the last years of the Sultan’s reign, forcing him to rely heavily on chieftains like Boletini, as well as landowning families in northern and southern Albania alike.
Young Turks, Split Albanians
With the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, headed by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), Abdülhamid II would be forced to adhere to constitutionalism and restore the Constitution previously in effect from 1876 to 1878. This consequential movement aimed to reform the Ottoman Empire and allocate more power to the popularly elected legislature, the Chamber of Deputies. The CUP sought cooperation with Albanian leaders through the restoration of the constitution and promises of equality. However, the CUP’s drive for a centralized Ottoman identity clashed heavily with Albanian demands for language and administrative rights. This would drive figures like Boletini to push back against the Young Turk government, as he wished to preserve the self-sufficient status and significant benefits awarded to him under the preceding Hamidian administration.
Albanian leaders initially aligned with the Young Turk government. Nexhip Draga, for one, lobbied the Ottomans to arrest Boletini and burn down his kulla (tower-house), as they viewed him as a Hamidian loyalist and his influence a general inconvenience. Some have framed Boiletini‘s stance entirely out of its proper context, for one reason or another painting him to be a pro-imperial fanatic. The evidence, however, points overwhelmingly to a powerful local chieftain seeking to maintain his position, which would drive him to reject the Young Turks.
The movement, in turn, would send a small detachment to Boletini’s home in Bajgora with orders to arrest him. Presented with this, Boletini demanded that the officer and his men leave and damned the Revolution. Within a short period, a battalion from the Ottoman Third Army would attack the Boletini kulla, and after a ferocious exchange of fire, force him to escape with a small force. In the aftermath, the battalion would burn Boletini’s home to the ground and begin to move against several other Albanian chieftains throughout Kosova. This came much to the dismay of a few cautious Ottoman officials such as one Hafız Ibrahimi, an ethnic Albanian member of the CUP who, in a letter to the leading Young Turk bureaucrat Talat Bey, advised the Ottomans to honor the promises of the constitution and not provoke the Albanian tribal leaders of Kosova, stating: “We will be as the guilty one who did not keep his word nor do what he said. You know the Albanian besa,” referencing the ancient code of honor and oath-giving.
The Young Turks rejected this caution and continued denying Albanians’ demands for national rights. This included sending military expeditions to Kosova and quelling resistance by Albanian peasants and authority figures alike. Much like Boletini, these Albanians rejected the Young Turk implementation of centralization, disarmament and taxation policies – though at times for disparate reasons.
The Uprising of 1910
Following this campaign of suppressing Albanian autonomy, Boletini would take action as one of the figureheads of the Albanian Uprising of 1910 alongside men such as Hasan Prishtina, Bedri Pejani, Idriz Seferi and – interestingly enough – Rexhip Draga. Having witnessed the poor treatment of Kosova under CUP control, Draga rejected the Young Turks and sought to reconcile with Boletini through participation and support for the revolt. These figures would pledge their besa to resist against the CUP’s policies.
Accordingly, Boletini and Seferi gather 9,000 men for the revolt. The latter, supported by Boletini’s control of the Mitrovica-Prishtina corridor, would take the city of Gjilan in eastern Kosova from the Ottomans with only 3,000 mobilized fighters. This synchrony essentially created a two-front insurgency that would temporarily overwhelm Ottoman forces.
From there, Seferi moved to cut off the Prishtina-Shkup railway and engaged the Ottomans at the Kaçanik Pass with a force of 5,000 while Boletini took Ferizaj and Prizren with a smaller detachment of 2,000 men. In response, the Ottomans would send an army 16,000-strong commanded by Shefket Turgut Pasha to meet Seferi’s warriors at the gorge of the Kaçanik Pass. After 13 hours of fighting, the outnumbered Albanians under Seferi would defeat this Ottoman force. Turgut Pasha would soon receive 40,000 in reinforcements to overcome Seferi and reopen up the railway. The Ottomans would overwhelm Seferi’s forces and force his retreat further into Karadak.
After this defeat, the two Albanian commanders would meet the Ottomans again at the Carraleva Pass in south-central Kosova just days later on 8 May. While they proved initially successful, local Serbs informed the Ottomans of a shortcut through the mountains, enabling Turgut Pasha’s soldiers to envelop the insurgents. While Seferi and Boletini managed to escape, thousands of Albanian warriors would be killed or taken as prisoners.
The Uprising of 1910 would be quelled, but not without significant difficulties, making them nigh Pyrrhic victories for the Ottomans. In August, the Empire reestablished their control over the vilayet of Kosova. The ensuing relentless measures to maintain control included the conscription of young Albanian men and their disarmament. They would go as far as resettling Albanian chieftains from Kosova to Anatolia. Despite its failure in the immediate term, the uprising established a strong resistance network between Albanian leaders, which would prove pivotal for revolts in the coming years – with Boletini at the helm.
1912: The Revolt Resumes
On 30 April 1912, the Albanians would return to revolt, spurred by movements in the Highlands of Gjakova led by Hasan Prishtina, a parliamentarian from Vushtrri and one of the most visionary political thinkers of the era. Prishtina relied heavily on military leaders like Boletini, who, on 20 May, made another pledge in the village of Junik with Prishtina, Bajram Curri and others to resist the Young Turks yet again. After some deliberation, the group finalized a list of twelve demands to be handed to the Ottoman government: free use of the Albanian language, the recognition of Albanians as a people group and the appointment of officials who knew the Albanian language among others.
While the forces awaited the Ottomans’ response, Boletini would concentrate the revolt’s operations with the aim of capturing several key cities. On 15 August, Boletini’s forces entered Shkup – now the national capital of North Macedonia – thus demonstrating the Ottoman inability to maintain control even in the administrative center of the Kosova Vilayet. These August victories would spur Prishtina’s more moderate wing to convince Boletini and other military leaders to continue negotiations with the Young Turks. The Sublime Porte, the seat of the Ottoman government, would agree to these demands on 4 September, virtually creating an autonomous entity, allowing Boletini to return to his home in Bajgora. However, this victory would be cut short by the beginning of the First Balkan War that October.
The conflict erupted with simultaneous invasions of the Ottoman Empire by Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro. With the Serbian assault came an attempt to divide the crumbling imperial realm. In order to protect their ethnic interests and desire for autonomy, the Albanians within the Empire sought to support the Ottoman army, with Ottoman forces supplying Boletini’s men with some 65,000 rifles. This was much to the dismay of Serbia, who expected Boletini to support their invasion.
However, the collapse of Ottoman defences left Albanian lands exposed to Serbian and Montenegrin hegemony. Boletini led the last significant resistance against Serbian forces in Kosova, utilizing the networks he and Seferi had established only months prior. Without this preemptive action, nearly all Albanian territories would have fallen before any political mobilization could occur, which may well have allowed Serb forces to move into the Albanian heartland and claim its coastline for themselves. The cumulative effect of the Uprising of 1912 created a narrow amount of time – mere weeks – in which an Albanian national assembly could convene and render a crucial decision on the question of an Albanian state.
Independence Comes
Albanians, not yet enjoying a state-structure of their own, were forced to rely on Ottoman institutions already in place, the deep cracks of which had begun to show; the partition of Albanian territory seemed inevitable. Recognizing this urgency, statesman Ismail Qemali would meet with Austro-Hungarian officials in Vienna, garnering their support for an Albanian declaration of independence, framing it as a means of halting Serbia from taking the Adriatic coast with the support of the Great Powers. Qemali would swiftly gather the Assembly of Vlora in the prominent southern Albanian city of the same name, and his hometown. Among the major cities of the Albanian heartland, Vlora presented the least hurdles from Ottoman forces.
Although Boletini was summoned to make the perilous journey south, some sources note that Qemali refused “to wait for the Kosovars” to officially declare independence. Boletini planned to cement himself as a political force in the construction of a new Albanian state, however southern elites would counter this aspiration by pulling him in to suit their militaristic needs, while retaining control of political processes.
Regardless, the Declaration would be signed by forty significant Albanian figures from around the territories where the language was spoken, and the flag of the newborn Albanian nation-state would be raised at 5:30 P.M. on the 28th of November, 1912. Boletini, although unable to sign the document, would shortly reach Vlora in safety with his band of northern tribesmen.
Legacies
Boletini would contribute significantly to the protection of the new Vlora government, demonstrating that the move for independence could be enforced and guarding the provisional system until the end of the year. He would join Qemali at the London Conference of 1913, which saw the signing of the Treaty of London, establishing the borders of the fledgling Albanian state – yet leaving a majority of Albanians outside of its borders. Boletini’s home region of Kosova would not be included in the state he fought to establish.
A famous story has Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, remark that Boletini, whom the Ottomans failed to disarm, gave up his weapons in London after removing his ammunition belt. “No, no, not in London either,” came Boletini’s response, after which he drew a second pistol from his pocket.
The following year, with the onset of World War I, Boletini would return to Kosova to command Albanian kaçak guerillas against Montenegrin and Serbian detachments. In late January 1916, he and two of his sons and grandsons would fall tragically in the city of Podgorica to the Montenegrin gendarmerie. Thus came to an end the eventful life of rebellion and maneuvering which allowed for the birth of a new, sovereign Albanian republic.
In the face of the historical record, it is clear that Albanian independence in 1912 was not the product of diplomacy alone but the finale of a decade-long armed struggle requiring continuity, territorial control and political legitimacy. Isa Boletini was the critical node connecting all three. Without his Hamidian autonomy, Albanians would not have retained the militaristic tribal structures required for later uprisings, thereby destroying any chance for the Seferi-Boletini duo to lead the Uprising of 1910. Without his recapture of key cities in 1912, the Ottoman Empire would not have granted concessions and the Balkan states would have faced no organized Albanian resistance during the onset of the First Balkan War. Finally, it can be said that if Boletini had not arrived as a defence escort at the time of the declaration in Vlora, Ismail Qemali’s independence move would have been diplomatically bold but militarily suicidal.
No historical analysis can be completed without acknowledging the alternative viewpoint. Several points may mitigate, although not completely overturn, the argument for Boletini’s indispensability. Qemali’s diplomatic genius and engagement with the Great Powers was crucial for international recognition. Prishtina’s parliamentary prowess and framing of Albanian demands shaped the coherence of the movement for autonomy. Nor can we forget Seferi’s military leadership, which proved instrumental in the successes of the 1912 Uprising; these efforts came together to help create the conditions for independence to seem plausible.
However, these factors alone could not produce an independent Albanian polity. Albania required a military and political nucleus capable of asserting and defending its self-agency. That nucleus was Isa Boletini. In short, he created the military, political and symbolic architecture that made independence feasible. His absence would have produced a drastically weaker Albanian position, one which the Balkan League may have erased entirely.
It is essential that readers new to Albanian history comprehend the context in which Boletini operated. Above all, he desired to preserve the rights and abilities of the Albanian tribesmen of the north to live autonomously. When threatened by forces outside of his control, Boletini valiantly took up arms without hesitation, and helped deliver the Albanian people a sovereign, internationally recognized entity of their own.
Valton Vuçitërna is a second-year student studying Finance at Michigan State University's Eli Broad College of Business. Valton was born and raised in Grand Rapids, Michigan to parents from Kosova. He is the founder of The Anadrini Project, a database designed to record the histories and genetics of families in Kosova's region of Anadrini, as well as the history of the town of Rahovec. He is interested in European history and the cultural heritage of the Albanian people.