Zelenskyy Refuses to Recognize Kosova: What Albania's Response Should Have Been
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Opinion: The Arbanon Editorial Team
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine who has taken global center stage in Ukraine's defense against the Russian full-scale invasion since February 2022, undertook a consequential visit to Belgrade, Serbia's capital, early this August. This signified a balance of Serbian support from its historic ally, Russia — which stretches back to pan-Slavic efforts that took a distinctly powerful form in the 19th and 20th centuries — and its Ukrainian foe. Russia played a major role in securing Serbian autonomy and eventual independence from Ottoman rule. It also offered major diplomatic support during the Balkan Wars, and later backed Serbia against the Austro-Hungarians in the events leading to World War I in 1914. It should come as no surprise, then, that Serbia has not joined the nigh-unanimous European sanctions on Russia and maintains important ties to the Kremlin.
The utility of a strengthened relationship between Ukraine and Serbia is clear for the former. The latter remains the dominant military power in the Balkans and strong evidence suggests it has indirectly sold weapons to Ukraine. It is against this strategic context that Zelenskyy stated that "Our position ... remains unchanged. We have always stressed this, and Ukraine's policy has not changed,” in response to a question on Ukraine’s non-recognition of Kosova’s independence.
Following the statement, Mayor of Prishtina Përparim Rama shared a video showing a major banner in support of Ukraine, placed there shortly after Russia’s invasion, being taken down in Kosova’s capital. Minister for Foreign Affairs Glauk Konjufca emphasized that the state “has stood unequivocally with Ukraine” since the invasion as “a matter of principle,” despite the latter’s non-recognition. This support notably included hosting Ukrainian journalists as refugees, joining Western sanctions and abolishing visas for Ukrainian citizens in March 2022, almost immediately after the February 24 Russian invasion. After providing a history of the historical process that led to Kosova’s independence as “a comprehensive international process” rather than a forceful annexation, entirely distinct from Russia’s moves in Crimea, the Minister extended an invitation for the Ukrainian state to recognize Kosova. No penalties or policy changes were announced.
Context
The ethnic, cultural and political connection between the Republics of Albania and Kosova seem to need no explanation, as the product of a single people with millennia of shared ancestry and language. Indeed, their separation is by no means the product of an internal decision but rather regional chauvinism, imperialist interests and the hard-knocks realpolitik of the Balkans in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
However, the positions of the two governments have often diverged in meaningful ways – often to Kosova's detriment. Though far from an exhaustive list, in recent years we can think of Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama's push to create the Open Balkans free trade agreement with Serbia and North Macedonia; widely seen as a means of signaling to the European Union the viability of the three countries and imposing pressure to accelerate their accession processes. Kosova's Prime Minister Albin Kurti diverged from other Balkan states by expressing a deep suspicion of the effort, citing Serbia's dominant economic and military position.
Of course, there are nuances with this as any relationship. In November 2014, Prime Minister Rama undertook the first visit of an Albanian leader to Belgrade since Enver Hoxha joined forces with then-close ally Josip Broz Tito in 1946. During a joint press conference, Rama described Kosova's independence as “an unchangeable and undeniable reality,” which then- Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić famously described as a “provocation.” There was also Rama’s October 2022 speech before the Council of Europe, where he condemned the infamous 2011 report by Swiss prosecutor Dick Marty, which directed gruesome, unproven allegations at the former leadership of the Kosova Liberation Army. Speaking in one of Europe’s key institutions, he also urged the swift membership of Kosova into the Council and the international use of its rightful name – Kosova, as opposed to Kosovo. Yet these instances cannot obscure an all-too-real pattern in the opposite direction.
Perhaps the most symbolically powerful example came in June 2023. When Kosova's Serbian minority boycotted municipal elections in April of that year at the behest of the Serbian government, the winners in Serbian-major municipalities turned out to be, as one might expect, ethnic Albanians. When the Kurti government facilitated the mayor-elects' assumption of office, ethnic Serbian residents rioted in opposition, injuring 93 Kosov[a] Force (KFOR) NATO-led international peacekeeping troops. Kosova's principal Western allies, the United States and the European Union, took what many saw as a surprisingly harsh stance against the small republic, chiefly by imposing sanctions. Far from deescalating the crisis, the punitive measures underscored a deep intractability in the conflict. To many, it is not entirely clear whether placating a stronger Belgrade, still aligned to Russia and China, carries much of a strategic interest for either Europe or the United States.
How did the Albanian government respond to the situation? One might expect it to stand with, or at least show some sympathy for, the strategically difficult situation of its sibling state. Rather, after a conversation with chief EU diplomat Josep Borrell, Prime Minister Rama announced the cancellation of a meeting between the two governments – a ritual charged with meaning but rarely leading to concrete policy outcomes – and proposed a closer format focused on the conflicts in Northern Kosova, which Prime Minister Kurti rejected.
The move represented a clear choice on the part of the Albanian government to side with the perceived interests of Europe, the "great family" to whose accession its entire foreign policy – and much of its domestic economic agenda – rests, rather than solidarity with the only other Albanian-majority state. This would also prove consequential as the principal turning point in the relationship between Prime Ministers Kurti and Rama, which has since stood between frosty and outright rivalrous. Kurti is seen as more closely aligned with historic Albanian nationalism and enjoys a general anti-corruption reputation. Rama, on the other hand, has taken virtually every opportunity to embrace a Europe-aligned agenda and frames himself as a visionary modernizer, though this has come increasingly under challenge during this summer’s protest movement.
Some commentators have also rightly questioned whether EU membership will prove to be the silver bullet the Albanian government has often framed it as. Though its economic and institutional advantages are clear in certain regards, it is hard to justify building a foreign policy solely tethered to the capacity and political will of a single supranational entity with its own multivaried interests – all the while lacking robust, sovereign institutional structures.
Geopolitical shifts throughout the West have elevated questions of sovereignty and national capabilities to a new level of importance. Albanian institutions cannot ignore such strategic questions without expecting serious consequences. This is, of course, not to undermine the clear value of a well coordinated approach to an issue as pertinent as Ukraine’s defense; yet for this noble project to be viable, no individual member of the alliance can be expected to forgo principal national interests.
Reaction to Zelenskyy
The reaction from Kosova rang relatively stronger, though still somewhat lacking. The Albanian government reached a new level altogether. On August 9, the day following Zelenskyy’s statement, the Foreign Ministry began a social media statement with: "President Zelenskyy’s visit to Serbia is important. Dialogue is always welcome …" After presenting the important point that Kosova's independence is both legally legitimate and a boon for regional stability, it ended on the note that Serbia and Kosova's path remain in the European Union. Importantly, it declared that Albania "will continue to stand firmly with Ukraine’s sovereignty." There was no mention of any policy shift in reaction to the statement.
We must begin here: as the statement itself acknowledges, Ukraine's interest is, at some level, understandable. It is waging a war of societal survival against a far more populous, better armed invader. The state's international search for dependable and plentiful weapons supplies is as clear a strategic necessity as it gets. Turning so clearly against Kosova's independence – arguably Albanians' dearest-held international position – is without doubt ugly, especially considering the public, sustained nature of Albanian support through over four years of war. Consider, for example, that the central avenue which houses the Russian Embassy in Tirana has been renamed Free Ukraine Road. Or Prime Minister Rama's very public confrontation with the Russian Ambassador to the United Nations in September 2023, when Albania held the monthly chairship of the Security Council. All this considered, we can understand that interests are interests, especially when one's life is on the line.
Yet as Ukraine harbors its interests, so do the Albanians. As the Ukrainian state and society have brought its forces together to resist a threat seeking to wipe it out, so does the principal fear for Albanians remain that Kosova's hard-fought liberty can be revoked by force. Ukraine has taken clear and swift steps to protect its interest; the Albanian government, in contrast, has confined itself to a statement of remarkably weak tone. Kosova cannot be said to be far off. The efforts to submerge the national interest within a broader European one – even when the two are clearly misaligned – is impossible to miss.
Yet does Albania, with its economic and geopolitical constraints, possess any other options? The short answer is yes. For one, the – admittedly, limited, aid – it sends Ukraine would be reconsidered by any nation whose chief interests are placed on the line by the recipient of that assistance. The amount of aid is certainly closer to symbolism than profound strategic importance, but any such support matters in time of war – not only materially but also as a symbol of broad international backing. There are strong indications that aid and trade networks between the countries are set to deepen, presenting further leverage.
The second and far more powerful tool at Albanian's disposal is entry into its increasingly valuable territory, especially in an age of booming tourism. Ukrainian travelers have somewhat preceded the mass post-2020 touristic boom, mostly from the West, and their numbers remain strong. One can hardly walk through a major touristic center in the Albanian South without hearing Ukrainian. In conversations with such tourists – most clearly far from impoverished, thus presumably wielding some political capital – you will learn that they have not all sought refuge outside of Ukraine. Rather, some take long trips directly from Ukraine to Albania for the vacation season, also an indicator of some means. Others reside in Albania full-time. While figures are not constantly updated or precise, of 32,000 Ukrainians who entered Albania from the February 2022 invasion, 2,500 remained at the end of that year. Complicating the process of entering and staying in Albania is both logistically feasible and presents real strategic leverage.
Some may criticize such a move as cynical. Yet is it not in exactly the same tune as Zelenskyy's statement? In general terms, there is some difference between statement and concrete, enforceable policy. Yet this is not the case when it comes to Kosova's international recognition – the stated positions of other governments are very much the policy in question. As Ukraine has taken steps vis-à-vis Serbia to protect its strategic interests, Albania can enact similar moves to protect the wellbeing of its national presence in the region – the right of any sovereign nation-state. Nor does an argument minimizing Zelenskyy’s statement as falling short of a new policy position, but rather merely as restating an existing one, stand. Prominently broadcasting opposition to Kosova's independence on the basis of “respect [for] international law” unmistakably harms the republic's standing – especially when stated from a representative of Ukraine, which has gained broad international sympathy on similar issues.
The reason no policy shift has been considered is both clear and concerning. Simply stated, Albania currently does not place Kosova's independence and future trajectory as a first-rate foreign policy objective. Rather, the government viewed by many Kosova Albanians as representing the 'mother state' has taken every opportunity to frame itself as a force of vaguely defined "regional stability" – far too often at the expense of Albanians outside of its borders. This could be observed in the positions of the old Zogist and Hoxhaist regimes, which sidelined the interests of Albanians in what is now Kosova, North Macedonia and Montenegro to placate their Yugoslav contemporaries. Later, the EU accession process, and more broadly cultivating an international perception of a placid, modernizing state has become the unchallenged raison d'être of Albania's foreign policy.
It is not, as Prime Minister Rama characteristically dismissed it, either “folk nationalis[m]” or the petty geopolitical calculations of “a small man” to raise these questions. When affronts to core strategic interests go entirely without a proportionate response, it is an intellectual duty to identify and question the constraints which produced that result. In this case, the chosen policy path is clearly the subordination of Albanians' interest to the perceived preferences of Brussels.
Some may argue that official Tirana or Prishtina may have been let into the announcement beforehand, or that Ukraine's strategic position in relation to the Albanians may change once the war is over. Yet it is very difficult to analyze policy on such speculations; furthermore, statements of this kind have real consequences on the international stage in the meantime.
It can understandably be asked whether a policy shift on Albania’s part might harm its own European standing or even the wellbeing of Albanians outside of its borders. Europe certainly retains the leverage to respond through punitive measures, yet it is not sensible to expect a fundamental negative change in Albania’s integration process after decades of investment.
Even in the unlikely case that Zelenskyy's statement represents a short-term expediency, later to be reversed to the Albanians' interest, our core critique stands. We ask to what extent the Albanian state is fulfilling the requirement presented not only by history but also Article 8 of its Constitution to "protect the national rights of the Albanian people who live outside its borders.” Is this dereliction of duty serving the interests of the Albanian state and its citizens, if not those of compatriots outside of its borders? These are questions whose importance means they cannot be constrained to closed-off technocratic discussion. Rather, they concern national direction and belonging within complex international structures.
As such, it is more than legitimate to ask: is it time for Albania to more closely consider some of its most important positions?
Arbanon Magazine began as a platform to thoughtfully bring to light major themes in Albanian history and current affairs. We also provide commentary on the broader region and beyond. Arbanon seeks to establish the role of the Albanian sphere in an increasingly connected world and serve as an information source which maintains its independence and integrity. Our small Editorial Team produces opinions on matters of particular importance.
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